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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[T]here are only ‘two categories’ of companies affected by trade secret theft 
— ‘[T]hose [sic] that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t know 
yet.’”1  Whether you imagine a cyber thief subverting a company’s network 
defenses or an employee selling secret information to a competitor, trade secret 
theft is a real threat.  The epidemic has ballooned to such proportions- $600 
billion –that combatting trade secret theft enjoys bipartisan congressional 
support.2  Despite Congress’s best efforts, there is no evidence the bleeding has 
slowed, much less stopped.3  
By its very nature, trade secret protection requires a delicate balance, unlike 
traditional intellectual property.  Within the intellectual property framework, 
trade secrets are an enigma.  Traditional intellectual property law grants inventors 
and artists legal protection for sharing their innovations; however, the 
government grants protection to trade secret owners who withhold their 
innovations.4   
The term “trade secret” likely brings to mind something like Coca-Cola’s 
secret formula; however, the law extends protection to less-obvious examples, 
such as a list of customer names or employee know-how.5   
If you accept Attorney General Holder’s position that every company has 
been compromised from trade secret theft, then Coca-Cola deserves a “shout-
out.”  Hundreds of years after the popular syrup was invented, the secret formula 
remains a secret.  The lengths Coca-Cola has gone to protect the formula is 
legendary.6  For example, the company retreated from India to avoid disclosing 
the formula to the government.7  Coca-Cola defied a court order requiring them 
to produce the formula during a lawsuit between the company and its bottlers.8  
Coca-Cola illustrates the true value of its secret formula through its extraordinary 
efforts to protect it.  Instead of relying on a legal safety net, the company itself 
guards its most precious treasure.  
 
 1  Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the Administration 
Trade Secret Strategy Rollout (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-eric-holder-speaks-administration-trade-secret-strategy-rollout. 
 2  COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., UPDATE TO THE IP COMMISSION 
REPORT 1, 3 (2017). 
 3  Id. 
 4  18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3). 
 5  Id. 
 6  Reuters, Dispute over Coca-Cola’s Secret Formula, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1993), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/03/business/dispute-over-coca-cola-s-secret-
formula.html. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Associated Press, Coca-Cola Refuses to Reveal Formulas, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1985, 12:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-09-11-fi-7372-story.html. 
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Not all companies are as successful as Coca-Cola.  In 2016, thieves siphoned 
an estimated $600 billion worth of trade secrets from United States companies; 
in response, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).9  The 
DTSA gives trade secret owners powerful tools to prevent their secrets from 
being disclosed and provides a private right of action for trade secret owners in 
federal court.10  Despite Congress’s noble intentions, the DTSA fails to protect 
America’s trade secrets and actually harms domestic innovation.  This Note 
argues for the repeal of the DTSA.   
Trade secret law attempts to protect unfair competitive advantages by 
preventing disclosure of the secret itself; however, companies rarely litigate over 
secrets like the Coca-Cola formula.11  Instead, employers predominantly use 
trade secret litigation as a means to limit employee mobility and reduce legitimate 
competition.12  As a result, trade secret law reduces innovation while also failing 
to deter trade secret theft.  Trade secret owners themselves, not Congress or the 
courts, are in the best position to prevent their secrets from being stolen. 
This Note briefly describes trade secret history, as well as the DTSA’s 
legislative history and two legislative sources: the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(UTSA) and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).  Secondly, this Note describes 
DTSA’s major provisions and analyzes how the law is used, and reviews how the 
courts interpret the Act.  Finally, this Note argues that trade secret law 
disproportionately and negatively affects employees and small businesses.  
Congress must repeal DTSA, shift its paradigm from preventing trade secret theft, 
and focus on actual trade secret theft as an unfair method of competition.   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. TRADE SECRET HISTORY – AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENIGMA 
Compared to traditional intellectual property law, trade secrets were born an 
oddity.13  Although some scholars trace trade secret law to the Roman empire,14 
modern trade secret law emerged from common law roots in Massachusetts 
 
 9  COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 2, at 3. 
 10  18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b). 
 11  See infra Section II(h). 
 12  See infra Section III(b). 
 13  For example, the Constitution charges Congress with establishing the patent system, see 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 14  See A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM. 
L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1930) (describing a cause of action protecting slave owners from third-
parties who attempt to bribe or intimidate slaves into divulging confidential business 
information). 
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during the early 19th century.15  Trade secret law evolved from tort and contract 
doctrines, where conflicts usually involved a breach of a confidential relationship 
between employer and employee, or a trade secret owner and a bad-faith actor.16 
The argument that trade secrets do not belong under the intellectual property 
“umbrella” at all is a strong one.  Intellectual property law encourages public 
disclosure of scientific advancements in exchange for legal protection.17  The 
government incentivizes innovation by granting exclusive rights to inventors, for 
a limited duration, so the world can build upon the advancements and creativity 
of others.18   
In contrast, as the name implies, trade secret owners are entitled to legal 
redress for not disclosing their innovations.  “Indeed, the very assumptions 
underlying patent and copyright laws—that government-granted rights can serve 
to incentivize the creation and sharing of new ideas and expression—are 
diametrically opposed to the notion of keeping information secret to gain a 
competitive advantage.”19  A “trade secret owner is rewarded for keeping 
information . . . away from the public for an unlimited duration.”20  Despite these 
differences, and as this Note highlights, trade secret law plays an important 
complementary role to patent law. 
B. WHAT  IS A TRADE SECRET? 
Generally, a trade secret is anything not commonly known by those within 
the industry and derives independent economic value;21 however, a trade secret 
owner must take reasonable steps to protect the secret before they can assert a 
claim for misappropriation.22  Misappropriation claims require allegations that a 
defendant improperly acquired, used, or threatened to acquire or use, the trade 
secret.23  Unlike a patent owner, a trade secret owner has no claim against a 
 
 15  E.g., Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 527 (1837) (granting damages for trade 
secret misappropriation); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 370, 375 (1866) (granting 
injunctive relief for threatened misappropriation). 
 16  See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 316-17 (2008) (describing the evolution of trade secret doctrine from a contractual 
employment relationship and a series of common law torts: breach of confidence, breach of 
confidential relationship, common law misappropriation, unfair competition, unjust 
enrichment, and trespass). 
 17  Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 11 
(2007). 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 6. 
 20  Id. at 11. 
 21  Lemley, supra note 16, at 317. 
 22  Id. 
 23  Id. 
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defendant who obtained the same secret through independent research, or even 
reverse engineering.24 
Generally, trade secret issues arise in three contexts: “competitive intelligence, 
business transactions, and departing employees.”25  Competitive intelligence 
describes attempts to acquire information about a competitor, and courts must 
determine if the conduct used was “improper.”26  Usually, improper conduct 
invokes an independent legal wrong in the form of trespass, theft, bribery, and 
so on.27  
Trade secret litigation that stems from a business transaction or a departing 
employee typically involves a breach of a pre-existing relationship.28  Improper 
conduct in this context is analogous to a breach of contract, where the trade 
secret owner asserts the defendant failed to abide by the terms of their 
agreement, implied or otherwise.29  
Distilled into its various pieces, trade secret law is merely a patchwork of 
various legal doctrines brought together under one umbrella.  For this reason, 
some scholars label trade secret law as “parasitic” and question the need for trade 
secret law altogether.30  Other scholars recognize “the economic benefits that 
flow from [trade secret law’s] existence, most notably incentives for businesses 
to spend less money protecting secret information . . . [and] as a means for the 
public to enforce populist norms about ‘commercial ethics.’”31  
 
 24  See Risch, supra note 17, at 12 (“[T]rade secret laws allow for the protection of identical 
information if two parties independently discover the information.”); id. n.40 (“[R]everse 
engineering is commonly accepted as an exception to improper means . . . .”). 
 25  Lemley, supra note 16, at 318. 
 26  Id. at 321. 
 27  Risch, supra note 17, at 10. The most famous exception to this position is the du Pont 
case.  See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(finding trade secret liability when aerial photographs were taken of a chemical plant under 
construction.  While under construction, plaintiffs asserted the plant layout itself was a trade 
secret that was necessarily exposed due to construction.  The court held that the flight, and 
photographs, did not break any law except for trade secret). 
 28  Lemley, supra note 16, at 318. 
 29  Risch, supra note 17, at 10. 
 30  See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 
CAL. L. REV. 241, 245-47 (1998) (“Contrary to popular view, trade secret law is not essential 
to the protection of intellectual property; in fact, most of its benefits are better achieved 
through contract.”). 
 31  Risch, supra note 17, at 5-6. 
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C. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION V. PATENT PROTECTION 
Given the choice, companies balance several considerations when deciding 
between trade secret protection and patent protection.32  For example, a trade 
secret owner’s “right to sue is triggered only when the secret is wrongfully used 
or taken.”33  A patent owner enjoys a government-granted monopoly.34  At the 
same time, patents are costly to acquire35 and even more to protect;36  whereas, 
the costs imposed on trade secret owners are theoretically proportional to the 
value of the secret itself.  
“Judges and lawyers have sometimes reasoned that because trade secret law 
provides less protection to the inventor than patent law does, no rational person 
who makes a patentable invention would fail to seek a patent . . . . That reasoning 
is unsound.”37  Trade secret and patent law counter-balance each other in cost 
and duration.  For example, the “disclosure required by patent law may enable a 
competitor to invent around the patent in less time than it would take him to 
discover the inventor’s secret.”38  More salient, if a patent owner sued for 
infringement, “patent litigation [is] very costly . . . [and] a patentee puts his patent 
at risk of being held invalid;”39  thus, the patentee endures the sunk cost of 
obtaining the patent to begin with.  “One way to avoid infringement is not to 
 
 32  This is true where businesses have the option to choose between patent or trade secret 
protection. Patent protection is limited to a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Trade secret protection covers a wider swath of 
information.  Thus, businesses only confront this choice when patentability overlaps with 
trade secret protection. 
 33  Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information: 
The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 867-68 (2002). 
 34  35 U.S.C.A. § 154. 
 35  See Stephen Key, Don’t File that Patent Yet. File A Provisional Patent Application First., 
FORBES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2018/01/08/dont-file-
that-patent-yet-file-a-provisional-patent-application-first/#6f3cc7cb57fe (noting that patent 
applications can “easily cost $15,000-$35,000); see also Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent 
in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-
cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/ (depending on the complexity of the 
invention, “attorneys’ fees through filing can certainly go well above $15,000”). 
 36  Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, BIG L. BUS. (Aug. 11, 
2017), https://biglawbusiness.com/cost-of-patent-infringement-litigation-falling-sharply 
(noting that the median cost for cases “with $1 million to $10 million at stake declined 47 
percent from 2015 to $1.7 million in 2017, according to the American Intellectual Property 
Law Association’s ‘2017 Report of the Economic Survey’ obtained by Bloomberg BNA. . . . 
In cases with below $1 million at stake, the median cost fell . . . to $800,000 in 2017. . . .”). 
 37  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 356 (Harv. Univ. Press ed. 2003). 
 38  Id. at 357. 
 39  Id. 
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patent.”40  Continuing on the theme of patent costs, an inventor may believe 
their invention is only of modest value and not worth the time and fees a patent 
requires.  In that instance, trade secret protection is an enticing alternative where 
the cost of protecting the secret would be proportional to its modest value.41 
Trade secret protection fills gaps created by the patent scheme.  For example, 
obtaining a twenty-year monopoly for an invention that technology is likely to 
outpace in five years is sub-optimal.  Considered together, trade secret law and 
patent law “reflect the fact that patent law cannot be tailored finely enough to 
cover every [invention].”42  
As this Note will show, the Defend Trade Secrets Act significantly increased 
trade secret liability, which may push businesses away from the patent process.43  
Initially, this appears to be a boon for small businesses and startups who may be 
deterred by patent costs; however, trade secret law is more damaging to smaller 
firms because of its implications for employee mobility.44  Because businesses 
use trade secret law primarily to control employee know-how and limit mobility, 
the law actively reduces innovation.45   
D. EVOLUTION  OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT 
Although born from the common law,46 modern trade secret law was 
predominantly codified by state legislation, until Congress passed the DTSA.47  
The majority of states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in various 
forms, as the basis for their trade secret law.48  At the federal level before DTSA, 
the Attorney General was solely responsible for protecting American trade 
secrets from economic espionage.49  The escalating instances of trade secret 
theft, and the perception that state-level trade secret law is inadequate to mitigate 
the threat, led Congress to pass DTSA in order to protect America’s competitive 
advantage–innovation.50  “Trade secrets are an integral part of a company’s 
competitive advantage in today’s economy, and with the increased digitization of 
 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. at 359. 
 43  See infra, Section II(c). 
 44  See infra, Section III(b). 
 45  Id. 
 46  See Lemley, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 47  John Cannan, A (Mostly) Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 109 L. 
LIBR. J. 363, 368 (2017). 
 48  Id. 
 49  Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (1996). 
 50  Cannan, supra note 47, at 365-366. 
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critical data and increased global trade, this information is highly susceptible to 
theft.”51  
The Defend Trade Secrets Act amends the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), 
but it also draws substantially from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) that 
most states have implemented in some form.52  Thus, one cannot fully 
understand the DTSA without understanding its two primary sources.  
 
1. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) 
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is the result of ten years of research and labor 
from the Uniform Law Commission.53  In response to uneven development of 
state trade secret law, as well as the inherent conflict between the goal of trade 
secrets (to prevent the distribution of innovation) and the goal of patent law (to 
encourage the distribution of innovation), the Special Committee on the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act formed on February 17, 1968.54  The Special 
Committee sought to establish a compromise between patents and trade secrets, 
as well as define the precise contours of trade secret law that litigants and courts 
could effectively rely upon.55  The Special Committee concluded its work in 1979, 
when the Uniform Law Commission recommended UTSA for enactment.56  
UTSA would undergo minor clarifying amendments in 1985, but has otherwise 
remained intact.57  As of this writing, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, District of 
Columbia, and forty-eight states have adopted the UTSA—most recently, 
Massachusetts in 2018.58  Although UTSA has been widely adopted, not every 
state adopted the statute in its entirety, and not every state court has interpreted 
its provisions in the same way.59  This variability affects multi-state companies 
most, since state law provided the only private right of action for trade secret 




 51  H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 3 (2016). 
 52  Cannan, supra note 47, at 368. 
 53  Id. 
 54  UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commission’s prefatory note to 1985 amendments (UNIF. L. 
COMM’N 1985), https://www.uniformlaws.org (search in search bar for “Trade Secrets Act”; 
then choose “Trade Secrets Act” hyperlink; then click “Documents” tab; then click “Final Act, 
with comments” hyperlink). 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 58  See Trade Secrets Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=3a2538fb-
e030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792&tab=groupdetails (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
 59  See Cannan, supra note 47, at 368. 
 60  Id. at 365-66. 
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2. The Economic Espionage Act 
By 1996, foreign and domestic trade secret theft incidents was on the rise.61  
Notable at this time, Congress considered foreign intellectual property theft a 
national security concern that had no meaningful remedy at law.62  Congress 
responded to this threat with the Economic Espionage Act, a criminal statute 
intended to arm prosecutors with the legal weapons necessary to protect U.S. 
interests.63  While deliberating, Congress actually considered adding a private 
cause of action to the original EEA, but some legislators expressed concern 
combining private civil remedies into a criminal bill.64  Congress intended to 
revisit this idea later in the term,65 but it would be twenty years before Congress 
fulfilled its intention. 
[The Economic Espionage Act] will help us crack down on acts 
like software piracy and copyright infringement that cost 
American businesses billions of dollars in lost revenues . . . [and] 
makes the theft of misappropriation of trade secrets a Federal 
crime. . . . [The EEA also] strengthens protection for our 
national information infrastructure by eliminating gaps in the 
criminal laws covering attacks against computers and the 
information they contain. . . . This Act will protect the trade 
secrets of all businesses operating in the United States . . . from 
economic espionage and trade secret theft . . . .66  
Despite these lofty expectations, the EEA produced only 125 indictments 
and ten convictions.67  Meanwhile, in 2012, the Director of the National Security 
Agency, General Keith Alexander, declared the loss of “industrial information 
and intellectual property through cyber espionage . . . the ‘greatest transfer of 
wealth in history’”.68  In 2013, an independent and bipartisan commission 
estimated United States businesses lost over $300 billion annually from 
 
 61  Robin L. Kuntz, Note, How Not to Catch a Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act Fails to 
Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 901, 903 (2013). 
 62  Id. at 904. 
 63  Id. at 904-05. 
 64  Cannan, supra note 47, at 369. 
 65  Id. 
 66  William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks upon Signing of the Economic Espionage 
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-
1996-10-14/pdf/WCPD-1996-10-14-Pg2040-2.pdf. 
 67  Joseph Brees, Trade Secrets Go Federal – Parade to Follow, 12 J. OF BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 282 
(2017). 
 68  Josh Rogin, NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the “Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History”, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 9, 2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chief-
cybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/. 
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intellectual property theft.69  Four years later, the same commission estimated 
that the value of trade secret theft could be as high as $600 billion.70  The EEA 
failed to deter, punish, or even slow industrial espionage, and Congress noticed. 
 
3. Congress Takes Action: The Defend Trade Secrets Act 
DTSA’s origins stretch back to 2012, when Senators Orrin Hatch and 
Christopher Coons led the initial reform effort.71  That bill eventually died,72 but 
the House resurrected the effort in 2014, which became the basis for DTSA in 
the Senate.73  Since 2012, only 1% to 3% of proposed legislation has been enacted 
into law.74  The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) not only survived the 
congressional grind, but also did so relatively quickly for major legislation.75  
Buoyed by bipartisan support76 and a $1.25 million lobbying effort from private 
industries,77  DTSA became law on May 11, 2016, 287 days after its introduction 
in the Senate.78  
Congress criticized America’s inadequate trade secret protections as 
justification for the Defend Trade Secrets Act.  Despite economic espionage 
being a “top priority for Federal law enforcement,” limited resources in the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Justice (DOJ) 
prohibited effective enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act.79  
Additionally, Congress sympathized with trade secret owners who relied on state 
courts to respond to multi-national trade secret theft.80  In particular, state-
 
 69  COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 2 (2013). 
 70  COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 2, at 1. 
 71  Cannan, supra note 47, at 366. 
 72  Id. 
 73  Id. at 367. 
 74  Statistics and Historical Comparison, GOVTRACK, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Nov. 1, 2020). 
 75  See Cannan, supra note 47, at 363. 
 76  Brittany S. Bruns, Note, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: Failure to Preempt, 
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469 n.3 (2017) (noting that DTSA received 410 “ayes”, 2 “nays”, and 
21 no-votes in the House, and DTSA received 87 “ayes”, 0 “nays”, and 13 no-votes in the 
Senate). 
 77  Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret 
Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 855 (2017). Most of this lobbying came from large private 
companies, such as Microsoft and Boeing; however, small business reportedly accounts for 
60% to 80% of American jobs; see Kaylee Beauchamp, Note, The Failures of Federalizing Trade 
Secrets: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Should Preempt State Law, 86 MISS. L.J. 1031, 1068-
69 (2017). 
 78  See  S.1890 - Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, U.S. CONGRESS, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1890/all-
actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22defend+trade+secrets+act%22%5D%7D&r=
1&overview=closed#tabs (last visited Nov. 2, 2020). 
 79  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016); H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 4 (2016). 
 80  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4. 
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implemented UTSA variations, although relatively minor, nonetheless led to 
different judicial interpretations that were case-dispositive.81 
“Protecting trade secrets has become increasingly difficult given ever-
evolving technological advancements.  Thieves are using increasingly 
sophisticated methods to steal trade secrets and the growing use of technology 
and cyberspace has made trade secret theft detection particularly difficult.”82  
Congress intends to give trade secret owners “redress in Federal court, just as 
owners of other forms of intellectual property . . . can seek remedies in Federal 
court for violations of their rights. . . . This narrowly drawn legislation will provide 
a single, national standard for trade secret misappropriation with clear rules and 
predictability for everyone involved.”83 Just like the EEA, the DTSA faces lofty 
goals.  
E. DTSA PROVISIONS 
Before assessing DTSA’s performance against Congress’s objectives, it is 
imperative to understand the statute’s provisions.  The following sections walk 
through DTSA’s major provisions and Congress’s stated intentions behind them. 
 
1. Unifying Trade Secret Definitions 
Before its passage, legal scholars criticized the draft versions of the DTSA for 
not aligning statutory definitions with the UTSA.  Scholars argued these 
differences would undermine Congress’s intent to “harmonize” the trade secret 
laws.84  Perhaps in response to this criticism, Congress amended DTSA’s 
definitions so they mirror the UTSA.  The DTSA defines a “trade secret” as: 
All forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, 
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, 
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, 
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, 
compiled or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, 
photographically, or in writing if: 
 
 81  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2-3.  See, e.g., Katch, LLC v. Sweetser, 143 F. Supp. 3d 854, 865 
(D. Minn. 2015) (determining whether Minnesota or California law applied would be 
dispositive since the case involved a claim applying the “inevitable disclosure doctrine,” which 
California does not recognize). 
 82  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2. 
 83  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 2, 6 (emphasis added). 
 84  See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV. 
317, 361-62 (2015). 
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(a) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and 
(b) the information derives independent economic value, actual 
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person 
who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the 
information.85   
Simply put, the DTSA makes clear that “nearly any type of information can 
qualify as a trade secret, as long as the owner took reasonable steps to keep it a 
secret and the information derives economic value from its secrecy.”86  This 
definition closely aligns with the UTSA. The EEA “trade secret” definition 
required the secret to be not readily ascertainable through proper means by “the 
public”; this variation from the UTSA caused some courts to apply meaningful 
distinction to this difference.87  In the DTSA, Congress clarified that it “does not 
intend for the definition of a trade secret to be meaningfully different from the 
scope of that definition as understood by courts in States that have adopted the 
UTSA.”88  The DTSA also included language explicitly declaring reverse 
engineering and independent derivation as proper means of acquiring a trade 
secret.89 
 
2. DTSA Statute of Limitations 
Both the DTSA and the UTSA have a three-year statute of limitations 
period.90  Congress did this despite “a number of States” enacting different 
limitations periods than the UTSA.91  Additionally, DTSA’s three-year 
limitations period is a reduction from the five-year limitations period afforded 
by the EEA.92  Congress also significantly increased the criminal penalties for 
trade secret theft in the DTSA amendment.93  Given that Congress admitted 
limited resources prohibited the Department of Justice from enforcing one of its 
 
 85  18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 86  Joseph D. Mornin, What You Need to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20, 21 (2016). 
 87  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 208. 
 88  Id. 
 89  See Cannan, supra note 47, at 369-70. 
 90  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 207. 
 91  Id. See also Bruns, supra note 76, at 487-88 (identifying states with different limitation 
periods: Alabama (two years); Maine, Nebraska, Ohio (four years); Georgia, Illinois, Missouri 
(five years); Vermont (six years)). 
 92  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 207. 
 93  See Cannan, supra note 47, at 379-80. 
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“top priorit[ies],”94 reducing the statute of limitations period while increasing 
criminal penalties is a curious decision.  Combined, these factors encourage more 
collaboration between the government and trade secret owners. Congress clearly 
expects private actions will lead, not supplement, public enforcement.  This is a 
good strategy so long as the private business interest aligns with the government.  
 
3. DTSA’s Private Right of Action 
The most dramatic amendment provides the first federal private right of 
action for trade secret owners. “An owner of a trade secret that is 
misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret 
is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or 
foreign commerce.”95  This provision replaced language in the EEA that gave 
the Attorney General exclusive access to federal courts.96  
Perhaps the most impactful DTSA provision though, is actually a hold-over 
from the EEA.  “[T]his chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace 
any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal, 
State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a 
trade secret . . . .”97  No preemption means trade secret owners have the option 
to pursue either a state action, federal action, or both simultaneously.98  
 
4. DTSA Civil Remedies 
DTSA gives trade secret owners two civil remedies: injunctive relief and 
monetary damages.99  Congress carefully crafted the injunctive language over 
concerns about DTSA’s impact on employee mobility.100  Injunctive relief is 
intended to “prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation.”101  Injunctive 
relief is commonly raised in the context of an employee leaving for a competing 
firm.102  Employers also use injunctive relief proactively through non-compete 
agreements that limit an employee’s future options.103 In either situation, 
injunctive relief is meant to prevent trade secret disclosure, but at a cost to 
employee mobility.  
States have varying levels of tolerance for using trade secret law as a method 
to limit employee mobility. For example, the “inevitable disclosure doctrine,” 
 
 94  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 198; S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016). 
 95  18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 96  18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 97  18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 98  Id. 
 99  § 1836(b)(3) (Westlaw). 
 100  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8-9; H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 206-207. 
 101  § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (Westlaw). 
 102  Lemley, supra note 16, at 318. 
 103  See infra, Section III(b). 
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made famous in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, stands as an example of a very employer-
friendly application of trade secret law.104  In that case, Pepsi successfully argued 
for injunctive relief against a former senior executive who accepted a position 
with Pepsi’s competitor, Quaker Oats.105  Pepsi never alleged that their former 
employee stole trade secrets, used trade secrets, or otherwise misappropriated 
trade secrets as defined by the statute.106  Instead, Pepsi argued their former 
employee, even acting in good-faith, would inevitably rely on intimate knowledge 
of Pepsi’s marketing, distribution, and pricing strategy in their new position.107  
Interpreting the Illinois Trade Secret Act (ITSA), derived substantially from the 
UTSA, the Seventh Circuit agreed with Pepsi and upheld the injunction granted 
by the district court against Pepsi’s former employee.108  In stark contrast to 
Illinois, California has explicitly rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine and 
even refuses to enforce non-compete agreements.109  
Congress, sensitive to these disparate views, sought to dodge this hornet nest 
by not preempting state law, and explicitly provided protections for employees 
within DTSA’s provisions. Under DTSA, a court may grant an injunction so long 
as:  
(1) the order does not “prevent a person from entering into an 
employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such 
employment shall be based on evidence of threatened 
misappropriation and not merely on the information the person 
knows;”110 or  
(2) the injunction otherwise does not “conflict with an applicable 
State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful 
profession, trade, or business.”111  
Therefore, since DTSA does not preempt state law, and injunctive relief is 
granted so long as it does not conflict with state law, Congress intended for these 
provisions to “coexist” with local state law.112 
DTSA also allows the court, in “exceptional circumstances,” to proscribe a 
royalty paid to the trade secret owner whenever an injunction would be 
 
 104  See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 105  Id. at 1263. 
 106  Id. at 1269-70. 
 107  Id. at 1270. 
 108  Id. at 1271. 
 109  See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002). 
 110  18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 111  Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
 112  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016). 
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“inequitable.”113  Royalties are also available in lieu of other monetary damages 
measured by the actual loss of the trade secret, including any unjust enrichment 
the defendant has realized above the value of that loss.114  Congress though, 
prefers “first [to] halt the misappropriator’s use and dissemination” of the secret, 
followed by the award of “appropriate damages.”115  Finally, a trade secret owner 
may seek “exemplary damages” worth twice as much as the compensatory 
damages awarded “if the trade secret is willfully and maliciously 
misappropriated.”116 
 
5. Deterring Trade Secret Trolls 
The DTSA expands trade secret owners’ available forums, and significantly 
increases a defendant’s liability.  This naturally creates an environment for 
“trolls.”  Troll is a term used to refer to litigants who bring frivolous claims 
hoping to leverage the significant cost of litigation (in time and money) and 
extract a valuable settlement.117  Modeled after the UTSA, Congress attempts to 
deter trolls with a provision that grants attorney fees whenever a 
misappropriation claim is made in bad faith.118  
 
6. Ex Parte Seizures 
DTSA’s most innovative provision, if not the most impactful, is the statutory 
authority granted to courts for the “seizure of property necessary to prevent the 
propagation or dissemination of the trade secret.”119  This provision is based on 
the Lanham Act.120  The Lanham Act, which generally governs trademark 
protections, uses ex parte seizures primarily for retrieving counterfeit goods.121  
Although innovative, this provision is also controversial in the context of trade 
secret law because the government seizes a defendant’s property without 
providing advance notice.122  Congress limited ex parte seizure to “extraordinary 
circumstances,”123 and its use is subject to numerous requirements.124  Despite 
significantly limiting its use, Congress expected this provision would be an 
 
 113  § 1836(b)(3)(A)(iii) (Westlaw). 
 114  Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B). 
 115  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9. 
 116  § 1836(b)(3)(C) (Westlaw). 
 117  David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 230, 234 (2015). 
 118  Id. § 1836(b)(3)(D). 
 119  Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 120  15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 121  Mornin, supra note 86, at 21. 
 122  Id. at 21-22. 
 123  § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw). 
 124  Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
17
Miller: Repeal the Defend Trade Secret Act: Why Congress Can't Rely on Tr
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2021
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2021  6:11 AM 
230 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 28:1 
important enforcement tool and required the Federal Judicial Center to publish 
a “best practices” report two years after DTSA’s enactment.125  
Much like the EEA before it, DTSA is expected to deliver on very lofty goals.  
Congress amended the EEA “largely in response to fears of misappropriation of 
U.S. trade secrets by foreign actors.”126  DTSA, however, is also supposed to 
“harmonize” state law differences by “provid[ing] a single, national standard for 
trade secret misappropriation.”127  Immediately after Congress enacted DTSA, 
critics offered their predictions on how likely DTSA would achieve its goals.  The 
next section walks through the major critiques of trade secret law generally, and 
then the DTSA specifically. 
F. TRADE SECRET LAW CRITICISMS 
1. Cyber Espionage 
 Despite strong bipartisan support in Congress, and “support from the 
intellectual property bar, including the Intellectual Property Law Section of the 
American Bar Association and the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association,”128  DTSA received mixed reactions from the academic legal 
community.  Law professors lobbied against DTSA’s passage, arguing that its 
provisions do not serve the underlying goals of the legislation:129 (a) to create a 
federal civil cause of action, (b) establish a uniform and predictable trade secret 
law, and (c) promote innovation by protecting American businesses from 
misappropriation.130  
The legislative history implies Congress intended for the DTSA to combat 
cyber espionage from foreign adversaries.131  Cyber espionage is partially 
responsible for the “greatest transfer of wealth” in history,132 directly targeting 
 
 125  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 6, 130 Stat. 376, 384 (2016). 
The Federal Judicial Center completed the report in June 2017, which is available at: 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/DTSA_Best_Practices_FJC_June_2017.pdf. 
 126  Mornin, supra note 86, at 22. 
 127  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 14 (2016). 
 128  Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 77, at 855-56. 
 129  Id. at 850-851 (arguing that the amendment does not “address the problem of 
cyberespionage” and creates the possibility for “abuse of DTSA litigation for anticompetitive 
purposes”). 
 130  Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1067. 
 131  Id.; see also Levine & Sandeen, supra note 117, at 233-34 (quoting Senator Coons’s press 
release, “In today’s electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few keystrokes, and 
increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of a foreign government or for the benefit of a 
foreign competitor. These losses put U.S. jobs at risk and threaten incentives for continued 
investment in research and development. Current federal criminal law is insufficient.”). 
 132  Rogin, supra note 68. 
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American trade secrets.133  DTSA critics argue that this legislation does not 
address that threat, and any focus on cyber espionage “may be misplaced.”134 
There is substantial evidence that supports the notion trade secret law is ill-
suited, or perhaps misused, as a means to deter or punish cyber espionage.135  A 
2010 study from O’Melveny & Myers LLP revealed that 93 percent of state trade 
secret cases “involved an insider, either an employee or a business partner. The 
percentage was 85 percent in federal cases.”136  In another study, “the Economic 
Espionage Act echo[ed] these numbers.  [The study] reviewed all 124 
prosecutions conducted by the government between the law’s enactment in 1996 
and 2012. . . . [In] more than 90 percent of cases, the defendant was an insider, 
either an employee or business partner.”137  Even in the midst of growing cyber 
theft, the majority of trade secret litigation implicated employees who have access 
to the information by virtue of their position within the company.138  In this way, 
strengthening trade secret protection only strengthens an employer’s leverage 
over employees. This advances policies that limit employee mobility and reduces 
marketplace competition while doing little to address cyber misappropriation.139  
 
2. Trade Secrets Should Not Be Federalized 
The legal academic community also criticized Congress’s desire to federalize 
trade secrets.140  As mentioned earlier in this Note, trade secret law draws from 
other legal areas, such as tort and contracts, which are traditionally state law 
issues.141  Federalizing trade secrets may promote uniformity in the law, but it 
also limits competition between the states for businesses and labor.142  Justice 
Brandeis famously explained federalism’s benefits as a means for “states to ‘serve 
as a laboratory[] and try novel social and economic experiments’ . . . to address 
the same issue or problem, ‘from which the best solution may ultimately 
 
 133  “Cyber espionage” means “[t]he use of computer networks to gain illicit access to 
confidential information, typically that held by a government or other organization.” 
Cyberespionage, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cyberespionage (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2020). Cyber espionage does not have a formal definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, 
nor Merriam-Webster. 
 134  Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1067. 
 135  See generally Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic 
Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014). 
 136  Id. at 220-21 (describing a study conducted by O’Melveny & Myers LLP in 2010, where 
the firm studied 394 federal trade secret cases between 1950-2008, and 358 state trade secret 
cases between 1995-2009). 
 137  Id. at 221. 
 138  Id. at 221-22. 
 139  Id. at 224-28. 
 140  See Seaman, supra note 84, at 365-69. 
 141  Id. at 364. 
 142  Id. at 365. 
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emerge.’”143  A federal alternative that primarily impacts employee mobility and 
marketplace competition hampers the states’ ability to compete for labor and 
business, which this Note addresses in more detail later.  
Turning away from trade secret public policy goals, specific criticism of the 
Defend Trade Secrets Act provisions generally falls into two buckets: no state 
law preemption, and the ex parte provision.  
G. DTSA CRITICISM 
1. DTSA’s Failure to Preempt State Law 
 As discussed earlier, Congress intended for the DTSA to “co-exist” 
alongside State UTSA laws144 but also “harmonize” the various laws.145 This is 
explicit in the DTSA’s language,146 as well as its  legislative history.147 DTSA 
supporters and critics predicted that the failure to preempt state law would result 
in less harmonization, increased internal and litigation costs, uneven application 
of the law, and anticompetitive abuses against small businesses.148   
Without preemption, DTSA does not “harmonize” the law, but instead 
“simply adds another layer of protection over the patchwork of state laws.”149  
Although Congress recognized that the minor differences in state laws 
sometimes proved to be dispositive,150  Congress merely provided trade secret 
owners with more litigation options and simultaneously introduced uncertainty 
for potential defendants.151  “Defendants do not get to decide whether they will 
be sued under federal or state law.”152  DTSA incentivizes forum shopping, and 
shifts “the balance of litigious power toward plaintiffs and away from 
defendants.”153  By adding another layer of variability, DTSA makes it more 
difficult for potential defendants to understand their scope of liability.154  Adding 
 
 143  Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932)). 
 144  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016). 
 145  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 196 (2016). 
 146  18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 147  H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 196 (2016). 
 148  Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1067-68. 
 149  Bruns, supra note 76, at 492. 
 150  Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 77. 
 151  See Bruns, supra note 76, at 493 (discussing examples where a plaintiff may choose Ohio 
state law over the DTSA because Ohio law offers punitive damages three times as much as 
the compensatory damages. DTSA allows only twice as much, whereas Alabama limits 
punitive damages to the same amount as compensatory damages.). 
 152  Id. at 494. 
 153  Id. at 494-496. 
 154  Id. at 493. 
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complexity also increases litigation costs, which critics predicted would chill 
“innovation and . . . growth of the American economy.”155  
Preemption, presumably, cures these ills.156  Preemption limits a plaintiffs’ 
incentive for forum shopping and mitigates increased legal costs for businesses 
who need to comply with both state and federal legislation.157  However, this 
also means the DTSA no longer “coexists” alongside state laws.  Instead, 
Congress must take an affirmative stance on controversial trade secret issues, 
such as the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 
 
2. DTSA Invites Trade Secret Trolls 
DTSA critics also predicted the rise of the trade secret “troll.”158  As 
mentioned earlier, a troll “intiat[es] lawsuits designed only to extract settlement 
payments or massive damage awards from scared defendants. . ..”159  The term 
comes from the well-known patent troll.160  Trade secret trolls can “cause the 
same drag on innovation and job growth,”161 particularly because “acquiring 
trade secret status and initiating trade secret lawsuits – which can include separate 
claims involving covenants not to compete, nondisclosure agreements, and labor 
mobility – are significantly less expensive and time-consuming than similar 
activity in the patent space . . . .”162  In addition to these relatively low barriers to 
file suit, the DTSA gives a potential trade secret troll the “extraordinary power 
to seize a defendant’s assets prior to judgment,”163 which disproportionately 
shifts power to the plaintiff and risks unnecessary harm to “businesses, including 
many start-ups . . . wrongfully accused of trade secret misappropriation.”164 
Increased reward for reduced effort invites weak, if not frivolous, claims.  Of 
course, some scholars believe the trade secret troll threat is overblown based on 
fundamental differences between trade secrets and patents.165  
 
 155  Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1068. 
 156  Id. at 1066-67 (“Yet, if the Act preempted state laws, then it would likely cause both the 
proponents and critics of the DTSA to be equally content, and it would lessen the potential 
negative effects on trade secret jurisprudence, the efficiency of the courts, and on business 
and innovation that may occur . . . .”). 
 157  Id. at 1069-72; see also Bruns, supra note 76, at 499-500 (arguing that preemption would 
decrease choice of law disputes and provide certainty to potential defendants). 
 158  Levine & Sandeen, supra note 117. 
 159  Id. at 234. 
 160  James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the 
Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1061-1062 (2016). 
 161  Id. 
 162  Id. 
 163  Id. 
 164  Id. at 235. 
 165  See generally Pooley, supra note 160; see also Brees, supra note 67, at 279-86 (arguing that 
trade secrets require some level of intent, and that ex parte seizure is limited to extraordinary 
circumstances: all points that mitigate a trade secret troll’s success). 
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3. Ex Parte Seizure Inappropriate in Trade Secret Context 
The ex parte provision allows courts, in extraordinary circumstances, to seize 
property from a defendant without notice in order to prevent trade secrets from 
being disclosed or used.166  Congress preferred to prevent information disclosure 
and hoped this seizure remedy would significantly contribute towards that 
goal.167  Rather than a tool to protect property though, some argue the ex parte 
provision is a weapon that “legally permits large corporations with sizable 
resources to silence less financially robust competitors, mostly in the form of ex-
employees.”168  By allowing ex parte seizure of a defendant’s property, Congress 
arguably allows the court to seize property without proper due process of law.169  
As mentioned earlier, trademark owners rely on ex parte seizures recovering 
counterfeit goods.170  “[A] court will not even entertain the idea of granting an 
ex parte seizure order if allegedly counterfeit goods do not contain a registered 
trademark.”171  A registered trademark gives the judge comfort that an 
independent examiner assessed the trademark’s protectability.172  There is no 
independent examination for trade secrets.173  Independent review and 
trademark registration gives the public “constructive notice that they may be 
infringing on an individual or entity’s property rights . . . .  There is no such 
notice in the trade secrets context.”174  Thus, “judges are forced to examine ‘the 
existence of a trade secret as a matter of first impression, without any guidance 
from an independent government examiner.’”175  The Federal Judicial Center 
confirmed the difficulty judges face when confronted with an ex parte request.176  
 
 166  18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 167  Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II). 
 168  Lauren Rayner Davis, Note, Secrecy for the Sake of It: The Defend Trade Secrets Act: A Devolving 
Global Market Based on the Legal Protection of Over-Secrecy, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 359, 363 (2017). 
 169  Id. 
 170  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016). 
 171  Davis, supra note 168, at 377. 
 172  Id. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. at 378. 
 175  Id. 
 176  See Timothy Lau, Trade Secret Seizure Best Practices Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 
FED. JUD. CTR. vi (June 2017), https://www.fjc.gov/content/323518/dtsa-best-practices-
june-2017 (“Cases involving seizures of trade secrets are inherently challenging. From a 
practical point of view . . . the courts generally will not have the luxury of time in handling 
these cases. Also, because [ex parte] may be invoked ‘only in extraordinary circumstances,’ 
individual judges are unlikely to build up experience with these types of cases through repeated 
encounters. These factors combine to make these cases difficult to adjudicate.”). 
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Despite these valid differences between trade secrets and trademark protection, 
the actual impact of ex parte seizures thus far dampens some of these concerns.177 
H. EMPIRICAL DTSA ANALYSIS 
Studying trade secret litigation only grants limited insight into DTSA’s 
impacts.  “Trade secret litigation can be quite expensive . . . median litigation cost 
for a trade secret case varied from $400,000 . . . to over $1.6 million.”178  Since a 
defendant faces stiff monetary damages in addition to litigation costs, “it is 
frequently more cost-effective ‘to settle than to litigate.’”179  Parallel federal and 
state trade secret claims exacerbate the incentive to settle. 
Trade secret claims present other unique assessment problems.  Some 
plaintiffs might prefer private alternative dispute resolution methods to avoid 
publicly disclosing trade secrets.180  Additionally, arbitration likely siphons a 
portion of potential DTSA litigation,181 since employment agreements 
commonly contain mandatory arbitration clauses.  Since 90% of trade secret 
issues are between an employer and an insider, arbitration likely reduces litigation 
incidents.  
Professors Seaman and Levine completed a comprehensive empirical study 
of DTSA litigation reviewing the statute’s first year.182  The study reviewed 486 
cases that raised a DTSA claim between May 11, 2016 and May 11, 2017.183  29% 
of DTSA claims arose from major technology and corporate hubs (Chicago, San 
Francisco, Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and New York City); however, DTSA 
claims were well-distributed across district courts (74% of courts had at least one 
DTSA claim).184  The study drew an interesting comparison to a patent case study 
from 2016 that found patent litigation concentrated in two district courts— 
Eastern District of Texas and Delaware; these patent-heavy districts handled 
only 3% of DTSA litigation.185  The study suggested DTSA expanded plaintiff’s 
 
 177  David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the 
First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 150 
(2018) (studying the first year of DTSA cases after its passage, the authors only found 10 out 
of 486 cases (2%) that requested an ex parte motion, and the court granted seizure in only two 
of them). 
 178  Id. at 134. 
 179  Id. (quoting Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in 
Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (1993)). 
 180  Id. 
 181  Id. at 134. 
 182  Id. at 150. 
 183  Id. at 124-25. 
 184  Id. at 139-40. 
 185  Id. at 140. 
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access to federal courts;186  78% of cases asserted supplemental jurisdiction over 
state law claims.187  45% of plaintiffs alleged additional federal claims188 and 
“nearly all cases with a DTSA claim also asserted one or more related state law 
causes of action.”189  Not surprisingly, “the most frequently raised state law claim 
was trade secret misappropriation.”190  Notably though, contract-related claims 
frequently accompanied a DTSA allegation.191  The frequency of these contract 
claims suggests trade secret misappropriation commonly happens in context of 
an insider or sharing agreement, either between two firms or between an 
employer and employee.  
The type of trade secret at-issue confirms this insider context.  Plaintiffs 
alleged misappropriation of their customer and business information (i.e. 
marketing, financials, customer lists, etc.) far more frequently than secret 
formulas or software algorithms.192  Although plaintiffs alleged “technical 
information” misappropriation fairly frequently (40%),193 the data suggests that 
there are far fewer instances of America’s “innovations” being disputed in court.  
In fact, the study confirms that historical trade secret litigation trends merely 
continued after DTSA.  “Approximately two-thirds of all DTSA disputes involve 
a current or former employee of the alleged trade secret owner . . . [and] 26% 
involve a current or former business partner . . .. Only 10% of DTSA claims (50 
cases) involve parties who lack a prior relationship.”194  In fact, “72% of all 
DTSA claims” assert the defendant is subject to a non-disclosure agreement 
(NDA).195  NDAs are frequently used to create a contractual obligation to 
protect confidential information.  
 
 186  Id. at 142 (finding 26% of cases lacked federal jurisdiction but-for the DTSA claim). 
 187  Id. 
 188  Id. at 142-43 (noting the most common federal claims plaintiffs brought with the DTSA 
were alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (20%) and the Lanham Act 
(15%)). 
 189  Id. at 143. 
 190  Id. at 144 (finding 84% of DTSA cases also brought a state law trade secret 
misappropriation claim). 
 191  Id. at 143-44 (breaking down contract-related claims brought in addition to a DTSA 
claim: breach of contract (70%); unjust enrichment (22%); breach of fiduciary duty (40%); 
breach of implied covenant of good faith (10%)). 
 192  Id. at 145-46 (noting customer lists and business information were alleged more 
frequently (58%) compared to software (22%) or formulas (8%)). 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id. at 146. 
 195  Id. at 148. 
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Only 9% of DTSA cases alleged any form of cyber espionage,196 and even 
fewer (6%) alleged misappropriation from a foreign entity.197  Although 
Congress passed the DTSA amidst the “greatest transfer of wealth in history” 
from American businesses to foreign entities,198 it seems clear the DTSA is not 
used for this purpose. 
I. A SNAPSHOT OF DTSA CASE LAW 
At the time of this writing, seven appellate circuits cited the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act, but none of the opinions contribute to the statute’s substantive 
provisions, and none address how to apply the statute’s provisions when in 
conflict with state law.199   
District court case law validates the preemption criticism DTSA received.  
District courts followed Congress’s intent for the DTSA to co-exist with state 
law;200  however, by doing so, the court reduced the DTSA into an amorphous 
being that takes a different shape depending on the context of the case at-hand.  
The following case demonstrates DTSA’s nebulous nature. 
 
1. In re Patriot National Inc. 
In re Patriot is a prime example of how the DTSA fails to harmonize trade 
secret law.201  Corporate Claims Management, Inc. (CCMI) provided insurance 
 
 196  Id. at 147 (“[T]he vast majority of trade secret misappropriation claims under the DTSA 
do not allege hacking . . . most hacking claims involve domestic rather than foreign defendants; 
only 4 cases assert that a foreign citizen plotted to steal trade secrets through 
cyberespionage.”). 
 197  Id. at 146-147 (showing that foreign defendants hailed from: China (7 cases); Canada (5); 
Singapore (3); France, India, Taiwan (2 each); Colombia, Cayman Islands, Germany, Japan, 
Jordan, Mauritius, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Russia (1 each)). 
 198  Rogin, supra note 68. 
 199  See, e.g., Par Pharm., Inc. v. QuVa Pharma, Inc., 764 F. App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(addressing the standard for preliminary injunction; treats DTSA standard the same as New 
Jersey’s standard); Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 Fed. Appx. 72 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(preliminary injunction standard); Akira Techs., Inc. v. Conceptant, Inc., 773 F. App’x 122 
(4th Cir. 2019) (attorney fees); Dunster Live, L.L.C. v. LoneStar Logos Mgmt. Co., 908 F.3d 
948 (5th Cir. 2018) (attorney fees); Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x 635 (6th 
Cir. 2019) (arguing in the dissent that DTSA should apply over Ohio state law, but notes that 
the provisions are essentially the same); CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., 920 F.3d 
560 (8th Cir. 2019) (statute of limitations); DTC Energy Grp., Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 912 F.3d 
1263 (10th Cir. 2018) (preliminary injunction standard); First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v. 
Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2017) (preliminary injunction standard); 
My24HourNews.com, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 791 F. App’x 788 (11th Cir. 2019) (statute of 
limitations). 
 200  S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016). 
 201  In re Patriot Nat’l Inc., 592 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018). 
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claims administration and risk management services for its clients.202  CCMI 
employed Michelle Shaiper as their Chief Operations Officer.203  In her role, 
Shaiper was privy to confidential business information.204  CCMI required her to 
sign an employment agreement promising “not to engage in any interfering 
activities during her employment.”205  In January 2018, Shaiper began working 
for a different insurance firm, Brentwood, after tendering her resignation the 
month before.206  CCMI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on January 
30, 2018, and initiated claims for trade secret violations against Shaiper and 
Brentwood shortly thereafter.207  CCMI alleged that Shaiper hired several former 
CCMI employees and that those employees brought CCMI customers with 
them.208  Those customers generated “approximately $3.4 million” in revenue.209  
CCMI alleged trade secret misappropriation under three statutes: “the Missouri 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA), the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(FUTSA), and the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).”210  
CCMI alleged misappropriation for seven types of information, which the 
court separated into two categories: customer list allegations and non-customer 
list allegations.211  Missouri law does not recognize customer lists as trade secrets; 
therefore, the court dismissed misappropriation allegations for that category of 
information, but maintained the allegations for the others.212  As to the Florida 
trade secret allegations, the court determined “[t]he only connection to Florida 
law in this case is the [Employee Agreement] signed by Shaiper . . . which states 
that Florida law will govern any disputes . . . .”213  The court maintained the 
Florida trade secret allegations against Shaiper, but dismissed the allegations 
against Shaiper’s new employer because Brentwood was not a party to the 
employee agreement.214  Finally, the court addressed the DTSA allegations:  
As the DTSA is to conform with state trade secret laws and not 
alter specific court decisions, the Court will mirror its rulings 
under the MUTSA and FUTSA. Therefore, the claims against 
 
 202  Id. at 569. 
 203  Id. 
 204  Id. 
 205  Id. 
 206  Id. at 569-70. 
 207  Id. at 570. 
 208  Id. 
 209  Id. 
 210  Id. at 574. 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. at 575 (citing Western Blue Print Co. v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 18 (Mo. 2012) as the 
authority that Missouri law does not recognize customer lists as protectable trade secrets). 
 213  Id. at 576-77. 
 214  Id. at 577. 
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Brentwood survive the motion for the Non-Customer List 
Materials (as they did under the MUTSA); and the claims against 
Shaiper survive the motion in their entirety (as they did under the 
FUTSA).215 
The court applied the DTSA differently against different defendants in the same action.  
DTSA merely increased the defendant’s liability.  DTSA has no shape.  What 
happens when courts are faced with a standalone DTSA claim? In the end, 
defendants are left unsure what liability they face when they leave a company.  
The complexity showcased by In re Patriot shows that trade secret litigation 
costs will only increase as well.  Courts and litigants must remain vigilant about 
what standards apply to specific claims. Increased complexity leads to increased 
costs and liability; defendants have little incentive to go beyond the motion to 
dismiss stage.  
J. PROPOSED DTSA AMENDMENT IN THE SENATE 
Senator Kamala Harris proposed an amendment to the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act, referred to as the “Deterring Espionage by Foreign Entities through 
National Defense Act of 2019” (the DEFEND Act).216  The amendment extends 
DTSA’s statute of limitations to five years and grants treble damages for trade 
secrets willfully misappropriated.217  The amendment also seeks to make it easier 
to enjoin trade secret misappropriation conduct that occurs outside of the United 
States by including the provision “the offense causes substantial economic harm 
in the United States.”218  As of now, no amendment addresses DTSA’s primary 
criticisms—preemption and ex parte seizure.  
III. ANALYSIS 
Congress must repeal the Defend Trade Secrets Act.  Trade secret law 
unsuccessfully attempts to protect the secret itself.  The trade secret owner is in 
 
 215  Id. (referring to DTSA’s legislative history and citing Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v. 
Schehr, No. 16-17528, 2017 WL 3721543, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2017) (“[E]xisting state law 
on trade secrets informs the Court’s application of the DTSA.”)). 
 216  DEFEND Act, S. 1865, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 217  Id. 
 218  Id. (proposed amendment for 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-
169), which currently reads: “This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United 
States if (1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the 
United States, or an organization under the laws of the United States or a State or political 
subdivision thereof; or (2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United 
States.”). 
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the best position to prevent their secret from disclosure.  Not Congress.  Not 
the court.  
Importantly, this Note does not advocate for abolishing trade secret 
protection altogether and does not view patent protection, by itself, as sufficient.  
“A more important consideration is that the patent route, because of its cost and 
required disclosures, often just is not attractive to an inventor of a patentable 
invention, so that to abolish or curtail trade secrecy would undermine incentives 
to innovate.”219  Applied correctly, trade secret law and patent law work together 
to encourage innovation and provide for appropriate protection.  
Instead, this Note argues for a creative alternative where the federal 
government focuses on actual trade secret misappropriation, specifically those 
actions that harm the competitive marketplace.  The DTSA, as used by trade 
secret owners and applied by the courts, stifles innovation and competition. 
Trade secret owners must accept more responsibility and accountability to 
protect their own secrets.  
Trade secret disputes generally arise under three situations: “competitive 
intelligence, business transactions, and departing employees.”220 As the 
subsequent sections show, only competitive intelligence disputes invoke a federal 
interest because those claims potentially include actions that unfairly harm 
competition and disincentivize innovation.  
A. SITUATION ONE: BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
Business transaction disputes do not invoke a federal interest. In the context 
of a joint venture, or other agreement where parties agree to share trade secrets, 
the contracting parties are in the best position to assess the impact that would 
result from the other party misappropriating their trade secret. A trade secret 
owner is in the best position to judge the risk, and reward, of trusting another 
party with their trade secret knowledge.  
B. SITUATION  TWO: DEPARTING EMPLOYEES 
1. Non-Compete Agreements 
Skilled employees suffer the most from trade secret law.  Employers control 
former employees through non-compete agreements and injunctive relief.  Non-
compete agreements preclude an employee from future employment with a 
competitor, at least for a certain period of time and usually within a certain 
geographic distance from the original employer.221  Both methods— non-
compete agreements and injunctive relief —are justified on the grounds that an 
 
 219  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 360. 
 220  Lemley, supra note 16, at 318. 
 221  Covenant not to compete, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw. 
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employee retains their former employer’s trade secret knowledge and will 
presumably use those secrets in their next venture.  
Employees’ covenants not to compete with their former 
employer for a period of years are an important method of 
protecting trade secrets, because it is easier to detect and prove a 
violation of such a covenant than it is to discover and prove that 
a competitor’s discovery of one’s trade secret is the result of 
unlawful appropriation rather than of independent research.222 
Although non-compete agreements promote judicial economy, their 
enforcement is based entirely on the contract and asks nothing about the secret 
that is actually being protected, or whether the secret exists.  Non-compete 
agreements operate under the guise of protecting an employer’s trade secrets, but 
these agreements also restrict employee know-how.  Trade secret law authorizes 
competitors to reverse engineer inventions as an explicitly proper method of 
uncovering a trade secret.  How is reverse engineering different from competing 
for the labor that produced the product?   
One of the benefits of allowing reverse engineering is the second inventor 
may use the discovered trade secret in a new innovative way instead of merely 
duplicating an existing product.223  “To forbid reverse engineering would inhibit 
the development of products that do not even compete with the one that has 
been reverse engineered.”224  Why is independent research and reverse 
engineering deemed “proper,” but hiring the skilled employees needed to 
accomplish this feat forbidden?  
There is growing bipartisan support in Congress for eliminating non-compete 
agreements.225  Non-compete agreements reduce employee mobility (including 
employees who wish to start their own business), stifles competition for skilled 
labor, and limits employee leverage negotiating for better conditions or higher 
wages.226  “The combination of expanding trade-secret law and the growing use 
of employment contracts covering post-employment activity has a huge impact 
 
 222  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 365. 
 223  Id. 
 224  Id. 
 225  See Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019); Workforce Mobility Act, S. 
2782, 115th Cong. (2018); Workforce Mobility Act, H.R. 5631, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 226  Ryan Burke, What You Need to Know About Non-Compete Agreements and How States are 
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on the career trajectories of many workers.”227  Non-compete agreements 
disincentivize skilled workers to develop new skills and expand their knowledge 
because their post-employment prospects are so limited.228  Studies show that 
“managers earn less and they receive incentive compensation less often in states 
with non-compete enforcements, all else equal. Other researchers found a similar 
effect in states that provide employers stronger controls via trade-secret law.”229  
[W]hen employers control not only true trade secrets but also 
general employee knowledge and skills, the net effect is it reduces 
investment and innovation. [Studies] found that states that allow 
employers to enforce noncompete agreements actually invest less 
per employee. And economists . . . found that in these states, 
venture capital investments generate fewer patents, fewer new 
firms, and less job growth.230 
Additionally, not only do employees struggle finding a job after leaving a firm, 
but start-up firms struggle hiring talent in states that enforce non-compete 
agreements.231  
Trade secret law protects actual and potential trade secret misappropriation;232 
thus, employers seeking injunctive relief under trade secret law are the functional 
equivalent to employers that use non-compete agreements. Congress’s potential 
legislation against non-compete agreements is non-sensical considering the way 
employers use, and the courts enforce, the Defend Trade Secrets Act.  If non-
compete agreements are foreclosed, Congress provides employers with federal 
court access to seek injunctive relief instead, via the DTSA.233   
 
2. Protecting Competition for Labor and Business 
States compete directly with each other for new business and labor.  For 
example, Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri bitterly compete 
against one another for new business; so much so that Missouri introduced 
legislation, at least twice, offering a truce with Kansas to put the fierce 
competition to rest.234 Trade secret laws play a role in state competition.  
 
 227  James Bessen, How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job Searches, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17, 
2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/how-companies-kill-their-
employees-job-searches/381437/. 
 228  Id. 
 229  Id. 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. 
 232  18 U.S.C.A. § 1832. 
 233  18 U.S.C.A. § 1836. 
 234  Missouri Offers Truce to Kansas in Business Incentive Battle, AP NEWS (May 17, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/f275b4faf8dd47df893674a96c584bf3. 
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“[E]vidence shows that states that enforce noncompete agreements experience 
something of a ‘brain drain.’ . . . [I]nventors tend to migrate to states that do not 
allow employers to enforce noncompete agreements.”235  Additionally, employee 
mobility improves innovation as “illustrated by the phenomenal success of 
Silicon Valley,” where California does not enforce non-compete agreements.236   
Silicon Valley employees move around more . . . no doubt often 
taking some of their previous employers’ trade secrets with them.  
The resulting pooling of knowledge may . . . contribute more to 
technological progress than the greater internalization of new 
technological ideas that a more effective scheme for the 
protection trade secrets would contribute. . . .”237  
The movement of employee know-how between firms promotes new knowledge 
at each stop, and promotes innovation upon existing technologies.  More 
importantly, employers are incentivized to foster a healthy work environment 
with competitive wages, and even encourage employees to seek additional 
training, education, or joint ventures that increase employee know-how and 
satisfaction. Instead of companies swapping trade secrets themselves, perhaps 
joint ventures that intermingle employees are more efficient.  “The informal 
pooling that comes from the unenforceability of employee covenants not to 
compete may be on balance more efficient [than cross-licensing 
technologies].”238 Even though this Note primarily argues that non-compete 
agreements should be abandoned completely, there is some justification for their 
existence.  For example, variable state trade secret laws could fuel competition 
for new talent and new businesses amongst the states. 
C. SITUATION THREE: COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE 
Congress should also consider its own cost-benefit analysis.  “Consider by 
way of analogy the distinction in international law between lawful and unlawful 
espionage . . . .”239  Lawful espionage is illustrated by a nation, “ferret[ing] out 
another nation’s secrets by patient collation of its published statistics and its 
newspaper articles.”240  On the other hand, “unlawful [espionage] is illustrated 
by bribery . . . , by extortion, by kidnapping . . . in other words, by common law 
offenses. In part the legal difference is due to the greater cost of preventing 
 
 235  Bessen, supra note 228. 
 236  Id. 
 237  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 365. 
 238  Id. at 366. 
 239  Id. at 363. 
 240  Id. 
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espionage of the first kind.”241  Non-compete agreements, discussed in the 
preceding section, do not distinguish between “lawful” or “unlawful” espionage.  
Instead, enforcement is based entirely in contract law, which fails to ask pertinent 
questions about the actual trade secret that is being protected.  Instead, non-
compete agreements operate under the assumption that trade secret 
misappropriation will happen.  This assumption, as well as the failure to inquire 
about the secret that is being protected, harms innovation and technological 
progress.  
Nonetheless, Congress should be concerned with the unlawful tactics used to 
gain a competitive advantage, because that inhibits a competitive process and 
competitive marketplace. Much like international law that tolerates lawful 
espionage, Congress should abandon all issues related to employee mobility and 
dedicate its resources only to those unlawful tactics. 
 
1. Trade Secret Law Incentivizes the Wrong Behavior 
Trade secret law requires trade secret owners to take reasonable steps to 
protect its secret, a shifting standard that is determined based on the value of the 
secret and the situation at hand.242  Judge Posner described the significance of 
the precautions trade secret owners use to protect their secrets in Rockwell Graphic 
Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.243  “The greater the precautions that [the trade 
secret owner] took to maintain the secrecy of [their secret] . . . the higher the 
probability that [the alleged thief] obtained [the secret] through a wrongful act; 
the owner had taken pains to prevent them from being obtained otherwise.”244  
Alternatively, a trade secret “cannot have been worth much if [the owner] did 
not think it worthwhile to make serious efforts to keep the information 
secret.”245  
However, we want trade secret owners to “take some precautions, but not too 
many.”246  Precautions are not costless, and “perfect security is not optimum 
security. . . .  If trade secrets are protected only if their owners take extravagant, 
productivity-impairing measures to maintain their secrecy, the incentive to invest 
resources in discovering more efficient methods of production will be reduced, 
and with it the amount of invention.”247 According to Landes and Posner, 
 
 241  Id. 
 242  See Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F. 2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“But only in an extreme case can what is a ‘reasonable’ precaution be determined on a motion 
for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that 
will vary from case to case and so require estimation and measurement by persons 
knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor.”). 
 243  925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 244  Id. at 179. 
 245  Id. 
 246  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 369. 
 247  Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc., 925 F.2d at 180. 
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Even without a law against the outright theft of trade secrets . . . 
a firm could do a lot to reduce the probability of such thefts . . . 
by screening employees . . . [and] installing more effective 
security systems. It will do less if the threat of legal sanctions deters the 
theft of its trade secrets.248  
The DTSA incentivizes trade secret owners to do less to protect their secrets.  
As this Note discussed previously, defendants faced increased liability, and 
increased costs, from trade secret litigation after the DTSA passed.  With 
increased costs, defendants are less likely to challenge litigation from trade secret 
owners.  Because of this, trade secret owners are in good position to secure 
injunctive relief without the need to defend the security measures taken to 
protect the secret at-issue, or if a legally recognized trade secret even exists.  
Trade secret owners enjoy the protection of a safety net that fails to incentivize 
them to protect their own secrets.  
 
a. “Break the woks and sink the boats” 
Nevertheless, trade secret owners are properly incentivized without a federal 
safety net. After crossing a river into enemy territory, a Chinese commander 
ordered his troops to set fire to their own boats and woks. The Chinese army 
would defeat the enemy, or they would die. There was no other option. Congress 
should follow this tactic. Trade secret owners are in the best position to prevent 
disclosure of a secret in accordance with the value of the secret. The law needs 
to hold trade secret owners accountable for that burden.  
Critics may express concerns that employees will not be properly deterred 
from stealing their employer’s trade secrets. However, a 1998 Israeli study that 
documented how often parents were late picking up their children from day care 
provides some evidence that should mitigate those concerns.249  Before the study 
began, parents were rarely late picking up their children, and were not fined the 
few times they were.250  After some time, researchers began imposing fines for 
late pick-ups; at which point, the study noted a dramatic increase in late pick-
ups.251  By placing a monetary value on being late, parents could complete a cost-
benefit analysis and determine if being late was worth the fine.252  In other words, 
before a fine was imposed, parents felt guilty requiring daycare workers to stay 
past closing.253  The study showed how a system built on non-monetary 
 
 248  LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 367 (emphasis added). 
 249  See generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). 
 250  Id. at 4. 
 251  Id. at 5-8. 
 252  Id. 
 253  Id. 
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incentives could be more effective than imposing a fine.254  Similarly, employers 
can properly incentivize their employees without threatening litigation and 
limiting their future employment opportunities.  Instead, investing in their 
employees can produce the non-monetary incentives similar to those shown in 
the Israeli project. 
Before the DTSA was passed, an Eli Lilly representative noted that 
sometimes departing employees would download Lilly trade secrets before they 
left.255  That action should be condemned, but be mindful that the value of those 
secrets are unknown, and whether the employee should even have access to 
those secrets is unknown.  If the goal is to prevent disclosure of secrets in the 
first instance, Eli Lilly is in the best position to do that, and that is where the 
government should motivate Eli Lilly to strengthen its own internal policies.  
Instead of providing a safety net in case an employee might disclose a secret, the 
government should focus on instances where Eli Lilly alleges actual 
misappropriation, such as the example Eli Lilly provided in their comment to 
Congress.256   
Sink the boats. Break the woks. Invest in your employees. What likely remains 
is intentionally wrongful conduct that the government can comfortably condemn 
because it likely harms innovation and competition. 
 
2. Federal Interest Properly Lies in Improper Conduct 
“[F]ocusing exclusively on protecting perceived trade secret rights misses the 
point that what we really care about is preventing certain behaviors that are 
deemed wrongful . . . .”257  The United States seeks to promote innovation and 
competition. As discussed previously, competition amongst the states is 
promoted by avoiding a federal trade secret law; however, Congress is rightfully 
concerned with trade secret theft when it rises to the level of unfair competition.  
Although Congress is in a poor position to prevent theft, the government could 
punish conduct that results in actual theft, or harms the competitive marketplace.  
Congress has battled unfair competitive behavior in the marketplace for over 
a century.  The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, bars conspiracies and 
combinations that restrain trade, as well as unlawful attempts to monopolize or 
maintain a monopoly.258  In 1914, Congress followed up the Sherman Act with 
the Clayton Act (generally, precluding stock or company acquisitions that 
produce anticompetitive effects),259 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 
 254  Id. 
 255  Cannan, supra note 47, at 366. 
 256  Id. 
 257  Levine & Sandeen, supra note 117, at 235. 
 258  Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1). 
 259  15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182) (“No person engaged in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole 
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Act.260 As its name implies, the FTC Act established the Federal Trade 
Commission as an independent agency.261  The FTC Act declares “[u]nfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce” unlawful.262  Furthermore, the FTC Act 
empowers the Commission “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations 
. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”263  
Competitive intelligence cases normally involve an independent wrong.264  
Competitive intelligence gained from these tactics easily constitutes unfair 
methods of competition that align particularly well with the Federal Trade 
Commission’s current mission.  Both Congress and the Supreme Court empower 
the FTC to establish what constitutes unfair competition.  As the Supreme Court 
noted, Congress “explicitly considered, and rejected, the notion that it reduces 
the ambiguity of the phrase ‘unfair methods of competition’. . .. It is impossible 
to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices.  There is no limit to 
human inventiveness in this field.”265  
Thus, the Supreme Court grants the FTC considerable discretion “in 
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard 
of fairness.”266  The Supreme Court adopted the factors the FTC considers when 
determining if an act is unfair, including “whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous,” and “whether it causes substantial injury to 
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).”267  Finally, the 
Commission’s experience using permanent injunctions and equitable monetary 
relief to restore competitive balance is critical in this context.268  
 
or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of another person engaged also in commerce 
or in any activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”). 
 260  STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 3:2 (2020-2021 ed.). 
 261  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) enforced the Sherman Act prior to the FTC Act being passed. Today, DOJ continues 
to enforce the antitrust laws, but there is no clear delineation in responsibility between the 
DOJ and the FTC.  Through their history, the agencies have occasionally disagreed on antitrust 
enforcement, most recently in 2019. See John D. McKinnon & James V. Grimaldi, Justice 
Department and FTC Skirmish Over Antitrust Turf, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-ftc-skirmish-over-antitrust-turf-
11564997402. 
 262  15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 263  Id. § 45(a)(2). 
 264  See Lemley, supra note 16, at 317-18. 
 265  F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972). 
 266  Id. at 244. 
 267  Id. at 244 n.5. 
 268  It is noteworthy though, that the FTC’s ability to seek equitable monetary relief is 
currently under attack, and in an unsettled state. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr., 
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However, simply giving this mission to the FTC will not save the United 
States from trade secret theft.  Aside from the persistent concern of scarce 
government resources, the Commission is limited to enforcing unfair methods 
of competition against foreign nations only when certain criteria are met269 and 
lacks expertise combatting espionage or cyber espionage.  Industrial espionage 
encompasses a diverse range of bad actors that could be domestic or foreign, 
private or national.  Combatting this diverse threat requires creative applications 
of the government’s expertise.  Perhaps, the government should consider a joint 
venture between the FTC and other government agencies, such as the National 
Security Agency who could bring cybersecurity expertise.  A government joint 
venture can act proactively to train businesses on proper security measures and 
publish best practices related to trade secret protection and policies.  
Whatever Congress molds as the solution, repealing the Defend Trade Secrets 
Act is the first step. The DTSA harms innovation while doing nothing to stem 
the $600 billion tide of stolen secrets270 leaving the country. Although 
government resources are always a concern, the sheer vastness of this problem 
warrants significant investment.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Congress must repeal the Defend Trade Secrets Act.  The DTSA 
unnecessarily adds complexity to trade secret litigation, gives plaintiffs an 
overwhelming litigation advantage, and fails to effectively protect trade secrets.  
Congress sought to structure the DTSA so that it co-existed alongside state trade 
secret law, but by doing so the DTSA merely adds complexity to litigation and 
fails to harmonize state law variations.  Additionally, amending DTSA to 
preempt state law negatively impacts state-level competition for business and 
labor. 
Neither Congress nor the courts are in the best position to prevent trade 
secret disclosure.  Trade secret owners bear this burden.  Instead, Congress 
should focus on actual trade secret misappropriation through unfair competitive 
conduct.  The majority of trade secret litigation affected business “insiders” and 
disputes over customer information or business strategy information.  Although 
business owners find this information extremely valuable to protect their local 
market share, this is hardly the innovative technical information that Congress 
believes gives the United States a competitive advantage.  
Variations in state laws reflect very different attitudes towards trade secrets 
and how best to protect them.  At the federal level, Congress has a legitimate 
 
L.L.C., 937 F.3d 764, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2019) (overturning circuit precedent to conclude that 
the section 13(B)’s permanent injunction provision does not authorize monetary relief). 
 269  15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). 
 270  COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 2, at 1. 
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interest in maintaining a fair, competitive marketplace; thus, trade secrets stolen 
through cyber theft or other industrial espionage tactics fall within Congress’s 
concern.  Trade secret law fails to combat these wrongs.  
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